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We will show that some results in Goyal and Moraga (2001), RAND Journal of Economics
32(4), are incomplete. The results are the social welfare and the total profit of the firms in the
complete network is lower than those in some networks. They focus on the symmetric
network gk where k is the number of links of each firm and show that the social welfare (the
total profit of the firms) in the complete network gn-1 is lower than that in gn-2 where n is
the number of the firms. However, their proofs are incomplete because there is no gn-2 if n is
odd. Therefore, this paper gives the complete proof of their result. That is, since there is gn-3
if n is odd, we show the social welfare (total profit) in the gn-1 is lower than that in the
network gn-3.
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We will show that some results in Goyal and Moraga (2001), RAND
Journal of Economics 32(4), are incomplete. The results are the social welfare
and the total pro￿t of the ￿rms in the complete network is lower than those
in some networks. They focus on the symmetric network gk where k is the
number of links of each ￿rm and show that the social welfare (the total pro￿t
of the ￿rms) in the complete network gn￿1 is lower than that in gn￿2 where
n is the number of the ￿rms. However, their proofs are incomplete because
there is no gn￿2 if n is odd. Therefore, this paper gives the complete proof
of their result. That is, since there is gn￿3 if n is odd, we show the social
welfare (total pro￿t) in the gn￿1 is lower than that in the network gn￿3:
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1 Introduction
Goyal and Moraga (2001) discuss the formation of R&D networks among
competing ￿rms. Their main result is that competing ￿rms may have exces-
sive incentives to form links. That is, the complete network in which all ￿rms
￿The author is grateful to Matthew Mitchell for helpful comments and suggestions.
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1form link with each other is stable, but (i) the social welfare in the complete
network is lower than that in some other networks, and (ii) the total pro￿t
of the ￿rms in the complete network is also lower than that in some other
networks. They show (i) and (ii) in their Proposition 7 (GM, p.696) and
Proposition 8 (GM, p.697), respectively, by focusing on symmetric networks
in which all ￿rms have the same number of links. A symmetric network is
denoted by gk where k represents the number of links of a ￿rm. That is, they
show that the social welfare (the total pro￿t of the ￿rms) in the complete
network gn￿1 is less than that in gn￿2 where n represents the number of the
￿rms. However, since there exists no gn￿2 if n is odd,1 the proofs are not
complete in the case that n is odd.
Therefore, we will provide the complete proofs of their results. That is,
since there exist gn￿3 if n is odd, we will prove the social welfare (the total
pro￿t of the ￿rms) in gn￿1 is less than that in gn￿3 if n is odd.
2 Model and Results
At ￿rst, we will provide a review of GM￿ s model. They consider a three-
stage model. In the ￿rst stage, ￿rms form pairwise links that represent
collaborative relationships. In the second stage, ￿rms choose their e⁄ort
level in R&D. Finally, the ￿rms engage in a Cournot competition, in the
third stage.
Let the set of nodes be N = f1;2;￿￿￿ ;ng where n ￿ 4. A node represents
a ￿rm. A relationship between two ￿rms i and j is represented by an edge:
ij: If there is an (no) edge between i and j; that is, if ij 2 g(= 2 g); then i
and j are (not) linked. A network g is de￿ned as a set of the nodes and the
existing links (or edges). Let Ni(g) be the set of the ￿rms with which i forms
the link, and jNi(g)j = ￿i(g). We call ￿i(g) the degree of i in g:
The R&D e⁄ort level of ￿rm i is given by ei ￿ 0: The cost function of
each ￿rm depends on a collection of e⁄ort levels fejgj2N and a network g: In
addition, we assume that the production cost function is linear. Speci￿cally,
the marginal production cost of i is
ci(fejgj2N) = ￿ c ￿ ei ￿
P
k2Ni(g) ek ￿ ￿
P
l= 2Ni(g) el;
1In this paper, the fact that there exists some (no) network means that we can (not)
physically construct the network.
2where ￿ 2 [0;1). The cost of i for R&D e⁄ort is ￿e2









which ensures interiority of the solutions. The quantity of i is given by qi.




By backward induction, we can have the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the second stage and third stage of this game for given g. That is, at ￿rst,
we solve the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for given fejgj2N and g, and second
we solve the Nash equilibrium levels of fejgj2N for given g: When we will
write the solutions as fqj(g)gj2N and fej(g)gj2N; the pro￿t function is
￿i(g) = [a ￿ Q(g) ￿ ci(g)]qi(g) ￿ ￿e
2
i(g);
where ci(g) = ci(fej(g)gj2N) and Q(g) =
P
j2N qj(g). Also, for given g,









GM especially focus on symmetric networks. Following GM, the pro￿t of
i 2 N and the social welfare in gk are,
￿i(g
k) =
(a ￿ ￿ c)2￿[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ (n ￿ k)2]
[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ (n ￿ k)(k + 1)]2 := ￿(g
k) for all i 2 N; (1)
W(g
k) =
(a ￿ ￿ c)2n￿[￿(n + 2)(n + 1)2 ￿ 2(n ￿ k)2]
2[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ (n ￿ k)(k + 1)]2 ; (2)
respectively. GM provide the following two propositions:
Proposition 1 (GM, Proposition 7, p.696) There exists an intermediate
level of collaborative activity ￿ k with 0 < ￿ k < n ￿ 1 for which ￿rms￿prof-
its are maximized.
Proposition 2 (GM, Proposition 8, p.697) There exists an intermediate
level of collaborative activity ~ k with 0 < ~ k < n ￿ 1 for which social wel-
fare are maximized.
3GM prove Proposition 1 and 2 by showing ￿(gn￿2) > ￿(gn￿1) > ￿(g0)
and W(gn￿2) > W(gn￿1) > W(g0); respectively. However, these proofs are
not complete. This is because there is no gn￿2 if and only if n is odd. This
fact is direct from Euler￿ s handshaking lemma: the sum of the degrees of all
nodes in any network is even. Thus, the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 by
GM are complete if n is even, but they are incomplete if n is odd.
Therefore, we need to derive su¢ cient conditions for Proposition 1 and
2 in the case of n is odd. By the theorem on existence of a simple graph
with given degrees the by Erdos-Gallai (1960)2, there exists gn￿3 if n is
odd. Thus, su¢ cient conditions for Proposition 1 and 2 will be ￿(gn￿3) >
￿(gn￿1) > ￿(g0) and W(gn￿3) > W(gn￿1) > W(g0), respectively, if n is odd.
By an elementary calculation, we can see ￿(gn￿3) > ￿(gn￿1) and W(gn￿3) >
W(gn￿1) for all n ￿ 5. The proofs are in the Appendix. Thus, we have
complete proofs of Proposition 1 and 2.
Appendix
At ￿rst, we will prove ￿(gn￿3) > ￿(gn￿1) for all n ￿ 5. By (1), we have
￿(g
n￿1) =
(a ￿ ￿ c)2￿[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ 1]
[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ n]2 ;
￿(g
n￿3) =
(a ￿ ￿ c)2￿[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ 9]





(a ￿ ￿ c)2￿ f[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ 9][￿(n + 1)2 ￿ n]2 ￿ [￿(n + 1)2 ￿ 1][￿(n + 1)2 ￿ 3(n ￿ 2)]2g
[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ n]2[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ 3(n ￿ 2)]2 :
This implies that ￿(gn￿3) ￿ ￿(gn￿1) > 0 if and only if
￿
2(n ￿ 5)(n + 1)
4 > 2￿(n
2 ￿ 6n + 3)(n + 1)
2 + 9n ￿ 9: (3)
First, suppose n ￿ 6: Then, both the RHS and LHS of (3) are increasing
in ￿: The LHS of (3) rises at the rate 2￿(n ￿ 5)(n + 1)4 and the RHS of
(3) rise at the rate 2(n2 ￿ 6n + 3)(n + 1)2: It is easy to show that, since
2See, for example, Berge (1976, p.115).
4￿ > n2=(n + 1)2; the LHS is increases at a higher rate than the RHS. Thus,
if (3) is satis￿ed for minimum ￿ and n ￿ 6, we have ￿(gn￿3) ￿ ￿(gn￿1) > 0
for all n ￿ 6. If ￿ = n2=(n + 1)2; then (3) is
n
4(n ￿ 5) > 2n
2(n
2 ￿ 6n + 3) + 9n ￿ 9:
This inequality holds for all n ￿ 6:
Second, if n = 5; then (3) is
￿144￿ + 36 < 0:
Since ￿ > 25=36; ￿(gn￿3) ￿ ￿(gn￿1) > 0 for n = 5.
Therefore, we have ￿(gn￿3) > ￿(gn￿1) for all n ￿ 5.
Next, we will prove W(gn￿3) > W(gn￿1) for all n ￿ 5. By (2), we have
W(g
n￿1) =
(a ￿ ￿ c)2n￿[￿(n + 2)(n + 1)2 ￿ 2]
2[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ n]2 ;
W(g
n￿3) =
(a ￿ ￿ c)2n￿[￿(n + 2)(n + 1)2 ￿ 18]
2[￿(n + 1)2 ￿ 3(n ￿ 2)]2 :












2 + 9n + 12) + 18n ￿ 18 (4)
For all n ￿ 5; both the RHS and the LHS of (4) are increasing in ￿; and the
LHS is increases at a higher rate than the RHS, because ￿ > n2=(n + 1)2.
Thus, if (4) is satis￿ed for minimum ￿ and n ￿ 5, we have W(gn￿3) ￿
W(gn￿1) > 0 for all n ￿ 5. If ￿ = n2=(n + 1)2; then (4) holds for all n ￿ 5:
Thus, for all n ￿ 5; W(gn￿3) > W(gn￿1):
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